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OTC derivatives market structure 
and the credit proﬁ  les of wholesale investment banks
The OTC market is at a critical crossroads from a number of angles – proposed regulatory changes, 
changing end-user expectations, competitive pressures from the listed market, and the effect of all 
these on the banks’ economics from the business. The possible paths forward may include central 
clearing, exchange trading, stricter capital, margin and disclosure requirements, for all or parts of the 
USD 600T market.  Moreover, as part of this process,  we are seeing the creation of new, or growth of existing, 
systemically-important institutions – central counterparties. Each of these paths, and the way in which they 
will interact, have different implications for systemic and individual ﬁ  rm risks.
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1| SUMMARY OPINION
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis exposed vulnerabilities 
in the business models of wholesale investment 
banks (WIBs). These include risk management 
weaknesses, high leverage, conﬁ  dence-sensitivity, 
excessive concentrations, opacity, and a high 
degree of interconnectedness. The extent of these 
vulnerabilities differs from ﬁ  rm to ﬁ  rm, but, at their 
core, they are a by-product of the WIBs’ business 
model and the structure of the markets in which 
they operate.  
At the apex of the crisis in the fall of 2008, the market 
appeared to shift away from credit differentiation 
as credit default swap (CDS) spreads on major 
WIBs spiked (charts 1 and 2). Fearing that the 
largest WIBs were inextricably connected, investors, 
counterparties, and customers rushed to reduce 
their exposures to the sector ﬁ  rst and ask questions 
later.  As a result, even the best capitalised ﬁ  rms 
came under great stress and required extraordinary 
external support to survive. 
The severity of the inﬂ  ection point was, of course, 
compounded due to the market’s previous tolerance 
of the WIBs’ high leverage, growing reliance on 
short-term funding, and, in many cases, 
ill-understood and therefore liberal use of customer 
collateral to fund their own operations.
The key factors contributing to the perception 
of interconnectedness were the same ones that 
served as the transmission mechanism for the 
market’s violent and unremitting response to it: 
overreliance upon short-term funding provided 
by the previously undiscriminating repo market, 
warehousing of risky assets whose valuations 
collapsed as leverage became more expensive and 
bids and liquidity disappeared, and the propensity 
to engage in crowded trades, made worse 
by leverage.
But arguably no factor was and remains more 
singularly associated with the interconnectedness 
of WIBs than their active presence in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. 
Measured at USD 600 trillion in notional amounts 
and dominated by fourteen global dealer-WIBs,1 it is 
one of the largest and most concentrated ﬁ  nancial 
markets in the world (chart 3).  
Currently unregulated and largely bi-lateral in 
nature, the OTC derivatives market itself is now at a 
critical inﬂ  ection point.  It is among the key subjects 
of ﬁ  nancial market reform initiatives in Europe and 
the United States. As of this writing, lawmakers and 
regulators are coalescing around a market structure 
based on central clearing, possibly exchange-based 
trading, higher capital and margin requirements, 
1  The 14 largest dealers that are part of the so-called “G14” Group.
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and more meaningful transparency standards. 
The expectations of end users of OTC derivatives are 
also changing as greater awareness of the market’s 
risks is leading some to scrutinise their relationships 
with dealers and explore such alternatives as the 
listed futures market. Finally, the dealers themselves 
have recognised2 the need for some structural 
reforms as being prudent and tactically necessary 
given the potential for very restrictive regulations.
The future OTC derivatives market structure and 
practices will have an impact on both systemic risk 
and the credit proﬁ  les of its major participants.   
For this reason, analysing the above-mentioned 
developments and their credit implications has 
been and will remain one of our key analytical and 
research priorities.
This article summarises our views on the credit 
beneﬁ  ts and risks of possible future market structures.  
We do so by ﬁ  rst covering the key shortcomings of 
the status-quo structure laid bare by recent events – 
the default of Lehman Brothers and the (near) collapse 
of Bear Stearns and AIG. We then discuss how central 
clearing, exchange-trading, and the imposition of 
higher margin and capital requirements may address 
these shortcomings.  Such a discussion, of course, 
would be incomplete without acknowledging the new 
risks or, at the very least, analytical considerations, 
that would be introduced by these approaches.
2  G14 dealers have outlined their speciﬁ  c commitments in a letter to the Federal Reserve released on March 1, 2010.
Chart 3
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2| THE STATUS-QUO MARKET
  STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES
In analysing the “credit delta” of any new market 
mechanisms, it helps to ﬁ  rst understand where the 
current system worked properly and where it did 
not.  Importantly, in thinking about “market structure 
and practices,” one has to go deeper than the market’s 
bi-lateral (as opposed to centrally-cleared) structure 
or, for example, the speciﬁ  c terms of the standard ISDA 
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association) 
Master Agreement template. The market’s structure, 
practices and behavior of its participants also reﬂ  ect 
the accounting and  regulatory capital treatment of 
OTC derivatives, the degree of public transparency 
about market exposures and concentrations, the 
perceived ratio of risks and revenue rewards from 
market-making activities, and the existence (or lack 
thereof) of clear and well-tested close-out procedures 
for a large counterparty.
With the above in mind, we offer our perspective 
on the key credit positives and negatives of the 
current market structure and practices of the OTC 
derivatives market.  We then discuss several of these 
in greater detail.  
CREDIT-NEGATIVES:
￿ contributed to both the reality and perception of 
interconnectedness among WIBs;
￿ reduced the market’s ability for credit differentiation 
to a binary view on whether a ﬁ  rm’s derivatives book 
was sufﬁ  ciently “too complex to unwind” so that it 
would warrant emergency government support;
￿ facilitated undercapitalised, reckless “carry trades”;
￿ in some cases, replaced risk management and 
hedging with “net-and-forget” self-deception; 
￿ Lehman’s OTC derivative counterparties incurred 
large trade replacement costs;
￿ ﬂ  awed customer fund segregation practices exposed 
Lehman’s counterparties to unexpected losses;
￿ compounded liquidity problems for Bear Stearns. 
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CREDIT-POSITIVES:
￿ OTC derivatives market-making has been a major 
net earnings contributor for WIBs; 
￿ enhanced hedging ability when properly used;
￿ intra-dealer netting and collateralisation practices 
have generally worked well;
￿ industry initiatives around redundant trade 
compression, electronic conﬁ  rmations,  and 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation’s (DTCC)
Trade Information Warehouse have improved the 
market’s operational integrity;
￿ CDS auction process has been battle-tested and 
appears to work well.
As discussed above, the WIBs active participation 
in the OTC derivatives market is a key reason for 
their interconnectedness. What does this mean? 
An interconnected market is not the same thing as an 
integrated market (or markets) in which capital ﬂ  ows 
seamlessly and valuations quickly reﬂ  ect the totality 
of available market data.  Highly-integrated markets 
can leave investors feeling shell-shocked as they did 
on May 6, 2010 when the US cash equity and futures 
markets fell in fearsome and self-reinforcing unison; 
still, they are generally accepted to be a good thing 
because they improve price discovery, liquidity, and 
efﬁ  ciency.
An interconnected market, in contrast, is deﬁ  ned by 
the condition whereby the disorderly failure of a large 
market participant can have negative, and potentially, 
catastrophic consequences for many of the others.   
This deﬁ  nition applies to the OTC derivatives markets 
where major dealers are interconnected through tens 
of thousands of bi-lateral OTC contracts, without 
the credit intermediation and just-in-time liquidity3 
offered by a central counterparty (CCP).  As a result, 
when a dealer fails, its surviving counterparties are 
faced with potential unsecured derivative receivables 
and the need to replace “orphaned” contracts in a 
volatile market.
Indeed, this is precisely what took place when 
Lehman Brothers defaulted in September 2008.   
As we discussed in our May 2008 research 
report on the CDS market (see box), most other 
major dealers suffered losses in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars each4 as their derivatives books 
became unbalanced due to the disappearance of 
OTC contracts with Lehman. In extremely volatile 
market conditions (chart 4) – themselves largely the 
direct consequence of Lehman’s default – dealers 
suffered signiﬁ  cant contract replacement costs and, 
until the necessary trades were replaced, hedge 
ineffectiveness.  In other words, market participants 
lost their OTC contracts precisely when they needed 
them most and when replacing them became 
most expensive.
Furthermore, the actual process of replacing 
trades – including the ineffective “risk reduction 
trading session” on the eve of Lehman’s default – 
was challenging. As all the major dealers were in 
a similar situation, the market became caught in 
something of a gridlock, as demonstrated by thin 
trading volumes during the post-Lehman week.   
Still, no other major institution failed, although 
it is difﬁ  cult to determine ex post to what degree 
3  Just-in-time liquidity refers to “liquidity that must be available at a particular location, in a particular currency, and in a precise time frame measured not in days, 
but in hours or even minutes.” Source: “Financial market utilities and the challenge of just-in-time liquidity”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, November, 2009.
4  Moody’s (2008): ”Credit default swaps: market, systemic, and individual ﬁ  rm risks in practice”, October 2008.
Box 1
 “Credit default swaps: market, 
systemic, and individual ﬁ  rm 
risks in perspective”
“In the event of a default by a major CDS counterparty, 
there would likely be considerable systemic damage that 
would extend beyond credit default swaps.”
“Since CDS protection sold by the defaulting 
counterparty would no longer be in place, the protection 
buyers would have to either replace such protection in 
the open market or bear the risk of not having such 
protection any longer. The pricing “shock” caused by the 
general widening of credit spreads following the failure 
of a major dealer, and the sudden increase in demand 
for CDS protection, could apply to both the CDS and the 
cash markets, and could lead to substantial losses for 
affected counterparties. In addition, the actual process 
of winding down the CDS book of the failed dealer and 
the collective attempts by its counterparties to replace 
the now-defunct CDS trades would put the CDS market 
under unprecedented operational strain.”
Source: Moody’s, May 2008.
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this was due to the then-unprecedented degree of 
government support extended to the sector.
Incidentally, the issue of trade replacement costs 
is not new – it was in evidence in 1998 at the time 
of the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM).  While dealers may have been demanding 
sufﬁ  cient initial margin to cover the potential future 
exposure of an individual trade, competitive pressures 
made it impossible for ﬁ  rms to demand sufﬁ  cient 
initial margin to fully cover trade replacement costs 
in a disorderly unwind. This was a major factor 
behind the industry’s decision to recapitalise LTCM 
with USD 3.6 billion to “buy time” and organise 
a more controlled liquidation.  
Lehman’s major counterparties did not suffer 
signiﬁ  cant credit losses on derivatives receivables 
because Lehman was subjected to and was able to 
meet collateral calls until the end. In this respect, 
the industry’s standard netting and collateralisation 
framework worked well. Still, an important aspect of 
the framework failed when the counterparties (mainly, 
hedge funds) of Lehman’s main UK subsidiary were 
not able to retrieve independent amount collateral 
(known in the centrally-cleared markets as “initial 
margin”) they had posted to Lehman, and are now 
pari passu with senior unsecured creditors who are 
Chart 4
Market conditions before and after Lehman’s bankruptcy announcement





















5  ISDA (2010): “Independent Amount”, Whitepaper, March.
facing low recoveries on their claims. This happened 
because customers’ independent amount collateral 
was not legally and operationally segregated from 
Lehman’s own collateral, as would be the case in a 
centrally-cleared solution. 
In a way, this situation was reversed in Bear Stearns’ 
near demise, which was compounded by a 
wave of novation requests by Bear’s hedge fund 
counterparties.  In a rush to reduce their exposure 
to Bear, hedge funds “assigned” their end of the OTC 
contracts to other dealers.  When the hedge funds 
left, Bear had to return their independent amount 
collateral – a total of possibly several billion dollars 
– which had been used by Bear to fund its own 
operations.  This became a major contributing factor 
to Bear’s liquidity crunch.  We note that following 
these events, the industry has proposed changes to 
the margining framework.5 
Beyond the mechanics of Bear’s and Lehman’s 
crises, the market structure and practices of the 
OTC derivatives market also contributed to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis in other ways.  Most importantly, 
the absence of universally applied minimum margin 
requirements – such as those that would be imposed 
by a CCP and/or by regulation – allowed certain 
market participants (most notably, AIG) to put on 
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a massive amount of market and credit risk, which, 
in turn, exposed all of its counterparties, and indeed 
the system – to counterparty credit risk.  Had AIG 
been required to post even a modest amount of 
initial margin against the hundreds of billions of 
dollars of CDS protection it sold, this would have 
materially reduced the economic attractiveness 
of its “carry trade”.  As a result, it is reasonable to 
conclude that AIG would have either signiﬁ  cantly 
curtailed its protection-selling appetite, or priced the 
risk differently, thus curtailing the demand.
For  some CDS protection buyers, the ability to 
“get away” with minimalistic and uninformative 
accounting disclosures, combined with arguably 
insufﬁ  cient capital charges, allowed them to net 
their longs and shorts, irrespective of the ability of 
protection sellers to perform. The result was the 
illusion of a “zero risk” carry trade. For a number of   
banks, this amounted to a “net-and-forget” approach 
to risk management, ultimately leading to large 
losses (in some cases, CDS protection ended up being 
entirely worthless), and materially weakened credit 
proﬁ  les.  Although no market structure can prevent 
errors in judgment or self-deception, additional 
disclosures, higher capital and margin requirements, 
and where appropriate – central clearing – would be 
credit positives by reducing counterparty risk and 
creating a more sensible risk-reward balance in the 
OTC derivatives market.
Indeed, the lack of transparency of the OTC 
derivatives market and participants’ exposures 
is among our key credit concerns with respect to 
WIBs.  Wholesale investment banks do not disclose 
enough information publicly to paint an accurate, or 
even approximate, picture of their OTC derivative 
exposures (current and potential) to a particular 
sector or counterparty.  As a result, in times of 
stress, the market’s ability to accurately differentiate 
among the WIBs in terms of their risk exposures 
or their exposures to one another is very limited.   
Such opacity and perception of interconnectedness 
makes for a dangerous combination with the 
WIBs’ conﬁ  dence-sensitive funding and customer 
franchises.  It can result in an undiscriminating 
withdrawal of funding and rapid and, in extremis, 
irreversible franchise erosion.  This vulnerability is 
at the heart of what we call “transition risk” (the risk 
Chart 5
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Sources: BIS, ICE, LCH.Clearnet. Centrally-cleared data represents open 
interest (not cleared volume). Dealer-to-dealer data as of December 31, 2009. 
CDS centrally-cleared data as of February 19, 2010. Interest rate 
centrally-cleared data as of February 28, 2010.
of multiple-notch downgrades), and is a key reason 
why our ratings on wholesale investment banks are 
currently under negative pressure. 
3| CENTRAL CLEARING
There currently appears to be strong momentum 
to transition much of the OTC derivatives market 
to central clearing.  Virtually all major legislative 
reform proposals in Europe and the US identify 
central clearing as a key goal for the OTC derivatives 
market, notwithstanding important differences in 
details such as whether it is to be mandated or 
encouraged, who would be exempted and whether 
it is to be linked with exchange-based trading.  
Additionally, the dealer community, and to a lesser 
extent the buy-side, have made tangible progress 
toward central clearing. Still, virtually the entire 
dealer-to-customer and much of the dealer-to-dealer 
markets remain bi-lateral (chart 5).
As noted throughout the prior section, we believe 
that central clearing for OTC derivatives can 
signiﬁ  cantly reduce credit risks – both systemic and 
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for individual wholesale investment banks.  The key 
reasons for this are as follows:
￿ For every counterparty that participated in central 
clearing, this market structure would replace 
multiple bi-lateral relationships with a single, 
fully net-able relationship with the CCP.  This is 
referred to as multi-lateral netting and its primary 
beneﬁ  t is the reduction of the aggregate amount of 
system-wide counterparty credit risk.  
￿ A CCP would shield its counterparties from the 
adverse consequences of a particular clearing 
member’s default.  Because their trades would be 
with the CCP, these counterparties would have 
neither unsecured receivables nor trades in need of 
replacement if another clearing member defaulted.   
￿ All centrally-cleared trades would be subject 
to uniform (and, presumably, conservative) daily 
margining.  The posting of such margin – both initial 
and variation -- would not only protect the CCP against 
a member’s default but would also create economic 
disincentives against taking on undue risk exposures.
￿ Subject to applicable regulations and its own rules, 
a CCP should be able to impose concentration limits 
on clearing members, which would reduce – albeit 
not eliminate – the possibility of a material market 
imbalance if a large participant fails.
￿ Should a central clearing solution gain traction and 
acceptance by the end-user community, this could 
increase the standardised proportion of the OTC 
derivatives market, making more contracts eligible 
for central clearing.  This would both improve the 
liquidity in the market as well as increase the netting 
and risk reduction beneﬁ  ts of central clearing. 
￿ If a signiﬁ  cant proportion of dealers’ derivatives 
books are centrally cleared, this would reduce both the 
reality and perception of their interconnectedness, 
thus reducing the credit transition risk for major 
dealers in times of stress.
￿ A CCP would have up-to-date information on 
individual member exposures thus improving both 
its and regulators’ ability to prepare for, and react to, 
market stress events.
6  For example, see Goldman Sachs’ research report (2009): “Effective regulation: Part 4. Turning good ideas into good outcomes”, October. The report’s authors estimated 
that more than 90% of Goldman Sachs’ OTC derivatives book, as measured by notional amounts, was “standard”. 
As can be seen from the above list, central clearing 
is capable of mitigating many of the of risks of the 
current market structure and practices.
However, central clearing cannot completely 
eliminate these risks if only because not all OTC 
derivatives are sufﬁ  ciently standardised and liquid 
to be centrally cleared. The exact proportion of the 
market that is, or can be made standardised, is hard 
to estimate, but based on publicly available research,6 
it appears to be more – possibly, signiﬁ  cantly more – 
than 50%, as measured by notional amounts. 
We think that central clearing can be a credit positive 
only if it applies to contracts that are reliably liquid 
and price-transparent. Both conditions must be 
satisﬁ  ed in order to facilitate daily margining (absent 
which a CCP cannot function as intended) and to 
ensure that a CCP can successfully liquidate a failed 
member’s portfolio.  
The latter consideration is sometimes overlooked 
but it is absolutely essential.  As stated above, the 
CCP shields its members from counterparty credit 
risk and trade replacement costs if one of them fails. 
It does so by concentrating these risks within 
itself by being counterparty to every trade. When 
a member defaults, the CCP becomes exposed 
to market risk because its previously perfectly 
balanced portfolio of offsetting longs and shorts 
is now unbalanced.  To rectify this and get back 
to a net-ﬂ  at posture, the CCP needs to liquidate 
the failed member’s portfolio by selling it 
(piecemeal or through an auction) to other 
clearing members (or their customers), with the 
failed member’s initial margin and any other 
guarantee funds available to absorb the costs of 
such a liquidation. This can only be accomplished 
if the portfolio is composed of liquid contracts 
with transparent prices.  
If – and for as long as – a CCP cannot liquidate the 
portfolio, it runs the risk of suffering potentially 
devastating market losses, which – if they led to 
the CCP’s failure – could in turn have devastating 
systemic consequences.  Similarly, if the CCP’s 
procedures were to allow it to simply allocate 
the illiquid and impossible-to-price trades to the 
surviving members, then such an approach would 
seem to fall short of a CCP’s stated purpose – 
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to shield surviving members from the consequences 
of a members’ default.  
In summary, allowing illiquid contracts to be 
centrally cleared would exacerbate risks.  Instead, 
for bespoke trades we believe that systemic and 
individual ﬁ  rm’s credit risks would be reduced if 
market participants held higher amounts of capital 
as well as posted initial margin collateral into a 
segregated account.
Central clearing reduces risk but it also concentrates it. 
We think that major CCPs are and will be systemically 
important entities insofar as their disorderly failure 
would have highly adverse systemic consequences.   
Therefore, whether they in practice reduce or 
exacerbate systemic risks will depend on each 
CCP’s risk management and operational capabilities.   
Furthermore, the speciﬁ  city and consistency of 
international regulatory standards and best practices 
for CCPs will be very important in ensuring that 
competition among them does not devolve into 
a “race to the bottom” on margin requirements. While 
the recently released CPSS-IOSCO’s (Committee 
on Payment and Settlement Systems-International 
Organization of Securities Commissions) guidance7 
for CCPs is a step toward establishing such standards, 
the speciﬁ  c requirements in the area of stress tests, 
capital adequacy, and operational capabilities have 
yet to be released. 
The nature and degree of competition among CCPs 
will also be a relevant credit consideration because 
a market structure with too many CCPs can 
introduce additional risks.  Firstly, a fragmented 
clearing architecture can reduce netting beneﬁ  ts 
and increase collateral demands8 –  in aggregate and 
for every major market participant. And secondly, 
if individual CCPs end up clearing only a relatively 
small proportion of the centrally-cleared market, their 
proﬁ  tability and, as result, operational capabilities 
could come under stress – from cyclical volume 
declines or competitive pressures. This would be 
especially true of stand-alone CCPs specialising in 
only one assets class (CDS or OTC equity derivatives, 
for example) since they might not have the beneﬁ  t of 
revenue diversity to shield them from market share 
or volume declines.
Finally, one possible negative consequence of the 
market’s embrace of central clearing could actually 
be the reduction in risk vigilance and consideration of 
creditor interests by the WIBs. Because they would no 
longer act as credit intermediaries (this role would be 
outsourced to CCPs), WIBs might have fewer business 
incentives to maintain strong credit proﬁ  les, which 
are currently necessary to win OTC derivatives 
business. If, as a result, the WIBs’ customers become 
less demanding of the WIBs’ to maintain strong credit 
proﬁ   les, this would make the risk management 
function of CCPs that much more critical.
4| EXCHANGE TRADING
Exchange trading of OTC derivatives can also 
help reduce systemic risk, albeit at the cost of 
undercutting the proﬁ  tability of this business for 
major WIBs. 
Exchange trading could increase the depth of 
liquidity for contracts that 1) are highly standardised 
and fungible, and 2) can attract enough supply and 
demand to support reasonable exchange trading 
volumes.  Deeper liquidity would strengthen the 
central clearing mechanism by improving the price 
transparency of traded contracts and strengthening 
the CCP’s ability to liquidate a failed member’s 
portfolio, as discussed above.
It is possible that exchange-based liquidity would be 
enhanced by electronic and high-frequency 
trading participants if the market offered adequate 
proﬁ  t opportunities.  However, for this to occur, 
the contracts would have to have sufﬁ  cient 
end-user appeal – as hedging and/or speculative 
instruments – for there to be sufﬁ  cient trading 
demand. Currently, OTC contracts that ﬁ  t these 
characteristics (CDS indices or plain-vanilla interest 
rate swaps) are already highly liquid and trade with 
tight bid-ask spreads.
7  “Guidance on the application of the 2004 CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for central counterparties to OTC derivatives CCPs”, May 2010.
8 Dufﬁ  e (D.) and Zhu (H.) (2010): "Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty risk?", March.
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But it is a plausible scenario that exchange-based 
trading would lead to higher trading volumes and 
even tighter bid-ask spreads. The consequences 
would be greater transparency and competition 
among market-makers. This would beneﬁ  t 
market efﬁ   ciency by transferring a portion of 
the bid-ask from dealers to the end users. The 
casualty of this would be dealers’ proﬁ  tability – 
a potential credit-negative.
Dealers generate signiﬁ  cant revenues from OTC 
derivatives market-making: JPMorgan Chase, for 
example, has disclosed that it generated fully a third 
of its overall investment banking proﬁ  ts from OTC 
derivatives in 2006-2008.  In large part, the proﬁ  ts are 
of a function of the absence of complete transparency 
into bid-ask spreads and the difﬁ  culty of electronic 
market-participants to offer “price improvement”.   
Additionally, OTC derivative revenues provide ways 
for WIBs to better monetise relationships with their 
corporate and hedge fund clients.  The WIBs’ ability 
to continue doing so would be negatively affected by 
open exchange-based competition. 
The dealers recognise the threat of exchange 
trading to their proﬁ  ts.  Because of this, mandating 
exchange-trading or automatically linking it to central 
clearing could have unintended consequences. To 
protect market-making and structuring spreads, the 
dealers could choose to reduce, as much as possible, 
the centrally-cleared proportion of the market by 
slowing down the process of contract standardisation. 
Put another way, if central clearing is the “ticket” 
to exchange-trading – a destination to which dealers 
do not wish to get – they may take a pass on the 
journey altogether.
To conclude, the current structure and practices of the OTC derivatives market contribute to the 
interconnectedness of large wholesale investment banks – a key vulnerability of their credit proﬁ  les.  The 
extent of such interconnectedness and the risks it poses could be reduced by central clearing of eligible 
contracts and appropriate capital and margin requirements on all contracts.  However, such beneﬁ  ts would 
only be realised if the systemically important CCPs are properly risk-managed and operationally sound, 
and do not compete on the basis of membership criteria or margin requirements. 
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